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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Santander Merchant Bank Limited appeals the District 
Court's denial of its Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for 
reconsideration of the final judgment that excluded 
Santander from the settlement of the underlying securities 
fraud action brought by investors against Cendant. 
Specifically, Santander claims that the District Court erred 
in failing to apply correctly the standar ds for determining 
"excusable neglect" in denying Santander's pr oof of claim 
which was mailed three days late. 
 
Cendant counters Santander's appeal on numer ous 
grounds, only one of which is left to us to consider in this 
appeal, the other claims having been resolved against 
Cendant in our opinion in a related case, In re Cendant 
Corporation Prides Litigation, No. 00-5199, slip op. (3d Cir. 
Nov. ___, 2000).1 Cendant's sole remaining counter- 
argument is that the District Court pr operly denied 
Santander the ability to participate in the settlement 
because Santander failed to demonstrate "excusable 
neglect." On the facts before us, we find that the District 
Court's decision in concluding that Santander did not 
demonstrate that excusable neglect caused the delay was 
not consistent with the sound exercise of its discretion. We 
will, therefore, reverse. 
 
Because related litigation is already the subject of at least 
three published opinions, each exhaustively setting forth 
the procedural and factual background, we will not do so 
here, but instead refer interested parties to these prior 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In 00-5199, we concluded that the District Court had the power to 
extend the deadlines stipulated in the Settlement and had retained the 
discretion to allow late-filed and late-cur ed claims. Equally applicable 
here (though that case involved Fed. R. Civ. P . 6(b)(2) and this case 
involves Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)) is our second conclusion in 00-5199 that 
the appropriate standard under which to evaluate requests to allow tardy 
proofs of claim or requests to cur e is "excusable neglect." 
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dispositions.2 We set forth only those facts crucial to a 




This appeal is one of several which arise out of the large 
securities fraud class action (Cendant PRIDES litigation) 
involving Cendant and its former officers. In June 1999, the 
District Court approved a $340 million settlement of the 
Cendant PRIDES class action litigation. Under the terms of 
the Stipulation of Agreement of Settlement and 
Compromise (the "Stipulation"), Cendant agreed to 
distribute one Right, with a theoretical value of $11.71, for 
each PRIDES owned as of the close of business on April 15, 
1998. See also In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 51 F.Supp. 
2d at 539-40.4 To collect the Rights each PRIDES owner 
was required to submit a valid proof of claim by June 18, 
1999. Under the terms of the Settlement Hearing Order, a 
settlement administrator, Valley For ge Administrative 
Services, was to verify the proofs of claim. The Rights, 
which are publicly traded, expire on February 14, 2001, 
when, in combination with the current PRIDES, they will be 
exchanged for new PRIDES. 
 
Class members who wished to participate in the 
settlement were asked to submit a completed pr oof of claim 
form by prepaid first class mail postmarked on or before 
June 18, 1999, addressed to the administrator as set forth 
in the notice. The class notice further provided that proofs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998), In re Cendant 
Corp. Prides Litig., 51 F.Supp. 2d 537 (D.N.J. 199), and In re Cendant 
Corp. Prides Litig., 189 F.R. D. 321 (D.N.J. 1999), provide a full factual 
and procedural history of this litigation. 
 
3. Bearing in mind the expedited nature of this appeal, for our recitation 
of the pertinent historical facts we have relied heavily upon the 
appellant's brief. These facts are of r ecord, and for the most part, not 
disputed by the parties. 
 
4. PRIDES are a particular category of Cendant Security. Cendant agreed 
to issue two New Income Prides or two New Gr owth Prides to any person 
who delivered to Cendant three Rights, together with existing Income or 
Growth Prides, respectively, befor e the expiration of the close of 
business 
on February 14, 2001, unless the Prides are amended. Id. 
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of claim would be deemed to have been filed when posted, 
if mailed by first class mail or air mail, postage prepaid, 
and addressed in accordance with the instructions given; 
proofs of claim filed otherwise would be deemed to have 
been filed when actually received by the administrator. 
 
The record in this case shows that on June 16, 1999, two 
days before the mailing deadline, Douglas Pr eston, the 
General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer of Santander 
Investment Securities, Inc., finalized a pr oof of claim form 
on behalf of appellant Santander Merchant Bank for 
301,400 PRIDES (worth, at the $11.71 settlement value, 
approximately $3.5 million). Preston delivered the proof of 
claim form to his assistant, Iris Figuer oa, for mailing to the 
administrator by postage pre-paid first class mail, certified 
with return receipt requested. Preston saw Figueroa place 
the completed proof of claim form in an envelope, address 
the envelope as provided in the claim for m instructions and 
affix a certified mail sticker to the package. Figueroa 
delivered the envelope to Santander's mail department and 
instructed the mailroom staff to mail the envelope 
immediately by first class certified mail. A member of the 
mailroom staff informed Figuer oa that he would take the 
package to the post office that day, and Figuer oa reported 
back to Preston that the package had been mailed. Thus, 
Santander believed that its proof of claim for m had been 
mailed on June 16, 1999, two days before the deadline. 
 
Though unknown to Preston at the time, Santander's 
proof of claim languished unattended in the mailroom for a 
week.5 On June 23, 1999, a new outside manager arrived 
to oversee and manage mailroom services. Upon his arrival, 
the manager discovered a large quantity of undelivered 
outgoing mail in the mailroom, including several pieces of 
certified mail, which he processed. The pr oof of claim form 
was apparently among the undelivered mail discovered on 
June 23, 1999, and it was sent out that day. At this time, 
apparently neither Preston nor the legal department knew 
that a mailroom problem had occurr ed or had any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Though largely immaterial here, disgruntled mailroom employees may 
have learned of their imminent replacement by an outside vendor and 
purposefully sabotaged usual mailroom functions. 
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knowledge or notice that Santander's claim had not been 
mailed on June 16. 
 
On September 2, 1999, however, Santander r eceived a 
letter from the administrator advising that its claim was 
being denied because it had been "received by [the 
administrator] after deadline for filing." That letter said 
nothing about the claim being mailed or postmarked late. 
Santander was advised by the administrator to write to the 
Clerk of the Court explaining the reason for the delay. 
 
Thus, when the administrator advised Santander in 
writing that its claim had been rejected as untimely 
because it had been received after June 18, 1999, Preston 
believed that this was an administrative err or on the 
administrator's part and that the error would be corrected 
by the Court. Santander wrote to the Clerk of the Court, 
explaining that the delay in receipt of the proof of claim may 
have been occasioned by use of certified mail and that 
Santander believed it had mailed the proof of claim on time 
and that it had to explain late receipt , not late mailing. 
 
On October 21, 1999, the District Court issued an 
opinion and order denying Cendant's motion to disallow 
late-filed proofs of claim and granting class plaintiffs' cross- 
motion for enlargement of the time to file or to cure proofs 
of claim. The District Court specifically found that an 
enlargement of the time to file or corr ect proofs of claim 
would not prejudice Cendant. The District Court extended 
the deadline for submitting or curing deficiencies in proofs 
of claim from June 18, 1999 to September 7, 1999, 
required a showing of "excusable neglect" for any delay, and 
directed lead counsel for the class to fur nish the District 
Court with the reasons for delay advanced by r ejected 
claimants. Apparently, Santander did not r eceive notice 
regarding the Court's decision of October 21. 
 
Despite not having received the notice, Santander wrote 
to the Clerk of the Court, on November 22, 1999, to inquire 
into the status of its claim. That letter reads in pertinent 
part: 
 
       We are writing to request infor mation on the status of 
       our claim with regard to the above-r eferenced matter. 
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       On September 2, 1999, we responded to a letter 
       received from Valley Forge Administrative Services, Inc. 
       whereby we affirmed that Santander Investment 
       Securities Inc., on behalf of Santander Merchant Bank, 
       Limited, had met the deadline for submission of its 
       Proof of Claim form. 
 
       Therefore, at this time, we would appr eciate receiving 
       information on the status of our claim. 
 
       If we do not hear from you within the next 20 days, 
       this confirms that our status in the claim has been 
       accepted. 
 
This letter reflected Santander's understanding that it had 
timely filed its claim. Santander did not r eceive any 
response to its November 22 letter. 6 
 
On January 14, 2000, the District Court denied 
Santander's claim for being late with "insufficient reason for 
delay." After receiving the District Court's decision on 
January 21, 2000, Santander communicated with class 
counsel and the administrator and asked to r eview the file 
with respect to its claim. The administrator faxed a copy of 
the postmarked envelope in which Santander's claim had 
been sent. Thus, Santander learned that its pr oof of claim 
form had been postmarked on June 23, 1999-- one week 
after it had been delivered to the Mailr oom for mailing and 
three business days after the original filing deadline. 
Santander claims that this was the first notice that it had 
that the proof of claim form had not been mailed on June 
16, 1999. Preston thereafter investigated the reason for the 
delay in mailing and learned that its own mailroom 
"problem" caused the delay. 
 
The District Court's final judgment was enter ed on 
February 23, 2000. On March 16, 2000, thr ee weeks after 
the District Court's entry of final judgment on Santander's 
claim, Santander moved in the District Court that the 
judgment be vacated under Rule 60(b) on the gr ounds of 
"excusable neglect." Santander had only discovered in late 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Santander's letter was actually docketed with a notation reading "Copy 
to Chambers," and the District Court indicated at later oral argument 
that it was aware of this letter at the time it was received. 
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January that the claim had been denied due to late mailing 
rather than late receipt, and had set to work to determine 
the cause of the late mailing and to try to r emedy the 
rather severe situation which it faced, that is, being 
excluded from the settlement. The Rule 60(b) motion cited, 
inter alia, its mailroom sabotage and good faith efforts to 
determine the origins of the delay. The District Court held 
a hearing on March 17, the following day. 
 
The District Court entered an order on Mar ch 21, 2000 
denying Santander's claim "for the reasons stated at oral 




On appeal, Santander challenges the District Court's 
denial of its Rule 60(b) motion to permit it to participate in 
the underlying settlement. Specifically, Santander asserts 
on appeal that in refusing to excuse its thr ee-day delay in 
the mailing of its proof of claim, the District Court failed to 
apply properly the standards for deter mining "excusable 
neglect" outlined in Pioneer Investment Services v. 
Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Ptrshp, 507 U.S. 380 (1993).7 Had 
the District Court properly applied the law, insists 
Santander, it would have excused the delay and permitted 
Santander to participate in the settlement, based upon the 
following factors, among others: the District Court's finding 
of no prejudice to Cendant; the delay's de minimis length; 
the delay's lack of impact on judicial proceedings; 
Santander's diligent efforts to file on time, its reasonable 
belief that it had done so, and its diligent ef forts to 
follow up on its claim; the erroneous notice fr om the 
Settlement Administrator that the claim had been received 
late, rather than mailed/postmarked late; and Santander's 
unchallenged good faith. 
 
In response, Cendant maintains that the District Court 
decisions here should be affirmed for several reasons 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In light of our holding in this case in Santander's favor, we need not 
reach Santander's additional contention that the District Court abused 
its discretion by treating it less favorably than other similarly situated 
class members. 
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including that at the time the District Court disallowed the 
claim, the only excuse Santander provided was that 
sometimes certified mail can be delayed in r eaching its 
destination; Santander's "excusable neglect" theory was not 
presented to the District Court at that time, and so should 
now be deemed waived; Santander did not offer the 
requisite "extraordinary circumstances" for Rule 60(b) relief 
and in particular, did not take timely action to investigate 
or explain the reason for its late proof of claim; and the 
mailroom events plaguing Santander were unproved, and 
even if they had been proved, they were Santander's own 
responsibility. In sum, Cendant claims that"Santander 
does no more than attack the District Court's decision as 
inequitable," and asserts that Rule 60(b) r elief must be 
grounded on extraordinary circumstances, and not "merely 
because a movant . . . believes the . . . decision to be 
unfair." 
 
Our examination requires a two-part analysis: (1) for 
purposes of the Rule 60(b) motion: whether Santander's 
delay in bringing its "mail room sabotage" theory to the 
District Court's attention was excusable; and (2) on the 
"merits:" whether the "mail room sabotage" theory provides 
a valid reason for its late submission of its Proof of Claim. 
The first inquiry regards the District Court's denial of 
Santander's Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the 
final judgment that excluded Santander from the 
Settlement. We review the District Court's denial of the Rule 
60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. In r e: O'Brien Envntl. 
Energy, 188 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir . 1999). We have held as 
to abuse of discretion, generally, that "an abuse of 
discretion arises when the [D]istrict[C]ourt's decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact." 
Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 2000 WL 1517673, at *7 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion may also 
occur "when no reasonable person would adopt the district 
court's view." Id. Finally, "we will not interfere with the 
[D]istrict [C]ourt's exercise of discretion unless there is a 
definite and firm conviction that the court . . . committed 
a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon 
a weighing of the relevant factors." Id.  If we conclude, as we 
do, that the District Court's decision was not consistent 
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with the sound exercise of its discretion, the second 
question arises: whether "excusable neglect" excuses 
Santander's delay in submitting the proof of claims. This 
involves a review of the matter de novo, applying the law to 
the facts. Id. 
 
A. The Rule 60(b) Motion  
 
Our first inquiry is whether Santander's delay in bringing 
its "mail room sabotage" theory to the District Court's 
attention was excusable. We conclude that it is. Preston's 
misunderstanding of the August 27th letter infor ming him 
that the claim had been "received" late was understandable. 
Santander's prompt response to the August 27th letter and 
its initiative in sending another letter in November establish 
that it was not derelict in discovering that its Proof of Claim 
had been postmarked late. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       Rule 60. Relief From Judgment or Or der 
 
       * * * 
 
        (b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly 
       Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon 
       such terms as are just, the court may r elieve a party or 
       a party's legal representative fr om a final judgment, 
       order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
       mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect 
       . . . or (6) any other reason justifying r elief from the 
       operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
       within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and 
       (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, 
       or proceeding was entered or taken. 
 




In Pioneer Inv. Servs., supra, the Supreme Court 
delineated the analysis required for afinding of "excusable 
neglect" (made applicable to Rule 60(b) though Pioneer was 
a bankruptcy case) and held that courts are per mitted, 
where appropriate, to accept late filings even where caused 
by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by 
intervening circumstances beyond a party's control. At the 
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outset, the Supreme Court pronounced that the inquiry is 
essentially equitable,8 and necessitates considering a 
situation's totality: 
 
       Because Congress has provided no other guideposts for 
       determining what sorts of neglect will be considered 
       "excusable," we conclude that the deter mination is at 
       bottom an equitable one, taking account of all r elevant 
       circumstances surrounding the party's omission. 
 
Id. at 395. 
 
While "all relevant circumstances" are properly 
considered, the Supreme Court specifically delineated four 
factors: 
 
       These include . . . the danger of prejudice to the 
       debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact 
       on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, 
       including whether it was within the reasonable control 
       of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good 
       faith. 
 
Id. In the wake of Pioneer, we have imposed a duty of 
explanation on District Courts when they conduct 
"excusable neglect" analysis. In Chemetr on Corp. v. Jones, 
72 F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 1995), we addr essed the Bankruptcy 
Rule that permits courts to accept late-filed claims when 
the late-filing was due to "excusable neglect." In Chemetron 
we held that the bankruptcy court's "analysis failed to 
adequately consider the totality of the circumstances 
presented." Id. at 349. Specifically, we faulted the court for 
failing "to make additional relevant factualfindings, 
including the danger of prejudice to the debtor , the length 
of the delay and its potential impact on judicial 
proceedings, the reason for the delay, and whether the 
movant acted in good faith." Id. at 350. The panel 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In the culminating argument in its brief, Cendant claims that 
"Santander does no more than attack the District Court's decision as 
inequitable," and asserts that Rule 60(b) r elief must be grounded on 
extraordinary circumstances and not "merely because a movant . . . 
believes the . . . decision to be unfair." Rule 60(b) relief is designed 
to 
prevent such unfairness and precisely requires such an equitable 
inquiry. 
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"remand[ed] the issue to the bankruptcy court, with 
directions [to] undertake a more comprehensive and 
thorough determination of whether the totality of the 
circumstances support claimants' defense of`excusable 
neglect.' " Id.; see also O'Brien , 188 F.3d at 127 (faulting a 
district court for not making specific findings as to 
prejudice). 
 
In our view, the District Court's decision her e suffers 
from the same defects identified in Chemetron and O'Brien. 
On Santander's Rule 60(b) motion, the District Court 
should properly have entertained an analysis of the factors 
constituting "excusable neglect" to deter mine whether 
Santander had met them. To fail to do so is a failure on the 
part of the District Court to properly apply the law to the 
facts of this case and provides grounds for reversal on the 
basis of abuse of discretion. See O'Brien , 188 F.3d at 122 
(abuse of discretion where ruling below founded on error of 
law or misapplication of law to facts). Here, the District 
Court did not apply the Supreme Court's enunciated factors 
for "excusable neglect," even when Santander urged it to do 
so at the oral argument. On March 21, 2000, the District 
Court denied Santander's claim "for the r easons stated at 
oral argument." 
 
At the Rule 60(b) motion hearing, the District Court 
declined to make a substantive analysis of the Pioneer 
"excusable neglect" factors, and rather , encouraged 
Santander to bring the case here, to the Court of Appeals. 
The District Court expressed impatience with the delay in 
Santander's bringing forth the mailroom debacle theory, 
without considering Santander's good faith or possible 
"excusable neglect" circumstances, stating that Santander 
failed to "get[ ] off its corporate duff to make the claim that 
you make now for excusable neglect." The District Court 
seemed to further abdicate its responsibility to apply the 
"excusable neglect" standard of Rule 60(b) when it 
suggested that the mailroom debacle was not worthy of the 
Court's consideration, particularly since Santander was 
presumed to be a sophisticated litigant not r equiring 
special protection: 
 
       Look, if you have inexperienced people handling a 
       million plus account, that's your problem, not mine. 
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       [and] 
 
       That is not my problem, especially in this type of 
       litigation. This is not a case of orphans and widows. 
       This is a case of savvy . . . business investors. And if 
       you have some incompetent handling your books, that 
       is your problem and not the Court's. 
 
Finally, the District Court concluded that 
 
       I haven't heard anything that has come close to 
       occupying the space that would be occupied by a 
       determination of excusable neglect . . . .[from the 
       attorney]. 
 
       I appreciate [the attorney] comes in at the last moment 
       .. . . But, from September until now, and particularly 
       since the time of the Court's opinion on January 14th, 
       we have heard nothing that comes close fr om [the 
       attorney] to explain why we are now in March hearing 
       this plea, not only to extend time to appeal, but for 
       Santander to be excused from judgment. I see nothing 
       that would even qualify for excusable neglect under 
       any of the motions and therefore they ar e denied. 
 
In short, we find that the District Court's statements at 
oral argument do not satisfy the explanation r equirements 
we mandated in Chemetron. In addition, we find that in 
misapplying the Pioneer factors, the District Court did not 
act in the sound exercise of its discretion. 
 
B. Excusable Neglect Factors 
 
We turn now to the applicable factors we delineated 
above, applying them to the facts not in dispute or 
controverted in the District Court.9  
 
We find that the length of Santander's delays were 
insignificant as a matter of law. We agr ee with Santander 
that its "delay" in bringing the Rule 60(b) motion was three 
weeks: the period between the time the District Court's 
decision disallowing its claim became final, February 23, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We have accepted the uncontroverted affidavits of Preston and 
Figueroa. Cendant does not challenge these except to assert that they 
are unverified. 
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and the time it brought its Rule 60(b) motion, March 16. 
Under O'Brien, "the length of the delay is considered in 
absolute terms." O'Brien, 188 F .3d at 130. This delay was 
trivial in light of the one-year outer limit for bringing a Rule 
60(b) motion imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and under O'Brien, in which we concluded that 
a two-month delay was insignificant as a matter of law, see 
id. 
 
Similarly trivial was Santander's delay in filing its initial 
Proof of Claim, five days or three business days, as 
Santander prefers to characterize it: the period between the 
original filing date, Friday, June 18, 1999 and the date the 
claim was postmarked, Wednesday, June 23, 1999. We 
agree with Santander that these few days could not have 
had any real impact on the judicial proceedings. 
 
The reason for the delay here was either unforeseeable 
sabotage by mailroom employees who purposefully misled 
Santander, or even more simply, a mailr oom which did not 
operate as it should have in the ordinary course of business.10 
Though the District Court dismissed this reason as 
"internal to your organization," we have reaffirmed that in 
Pioneer, the Supreme Court "explicitly rejected the 
argument that excusable neglect applies only to those 
situations where the failure to comply is a result of 
circumstances beyond the [claimant's] r easonable control." 
O'Brien, 188 F.3d at 125. 
 
There is not any evidence that Santander acted in bad 
faith, either in bringing its Rule 60(b) motion or in filing its 
late claim. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence that 
Santander acted with good faith throughout. Those 
individuals directly responsible for the Santander claim, 
Preston and Figueroa, were far fr om derelict in performing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Interestingly, in the course of the settlement litigation, the 
District 
Court did accept as valid both reasons similar to, and even those less 
compelling, than Santander's. For example, in another claimant's case, 
Mellon's delay in filing was excused because a clerk at Mellon who had 
been ill and depressed for months was der elict in his duties. In 
addition, 
two other class members were excused due to mailroom problems: in 
one case mail was handled "contrary to custom," and in the other, there 
were problems in an internal corporate mailroom. 
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their duties. Santander's agents took steps to ensur e that 
the proof of claim would be mailed out in a timely fashion, 
and reasonably believed that it had. When err oneously 
notified that the claim had been rejected due to late receipt, 
Santander took whatever steps it could to investigate and to 
mitigate damage to itself. A period ensued during which 
Santander was "shut out" of communications to class 
members, and upon learning very late in the game the true 
reason for the denial, the late mailing, Santander acted 
with reasonable haste to investigate the pr oblem and to 
take available steps toward a remedy. 
 
Finally, in terms of prejudice to Cendant, the District 
Court found that Cendant would not suffer any prejudice 
when the District Court extended the deadline fr om June 
18 to September 7, 1999, after Santander's claim had been 
mailed and received. The Court found that Cendant would 
not be harmed because the original limits of Cendant's 
financial obligation had not been expanded. Cendant's 
argument that it is now prejudiced because the settlement 
money which might now go to Santander will not be 
"leftover" for Cendant to recoup is without merit.11 In truth, 
since the only "prejudice" Cendant would suffer by being 
forced to pay Santander is the "loss of a windfall," we 
conclude that Cendant will suffer no pr ejudice at all. See 




After a careful review of the recor d, we find that the 
District Court's misapplication of the Pioneer  factors in 
denying Santander's Rule 60(b) motion to be beyond the 
sound exercise of its discretion. W e further find that any 
neglect by Santander in submitting its Proof of Claim form 
late was "excusable neglect," justifying the allowance of its 
claim to settlement participation. We thus r everse the 
District Court's denial of Santander's claim on the basis of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See In re Cendant Corporation Prides Litigation, No. 00-5199, slip op. 
(3d Cir. Nov. ___, 2000) for further discussion of the District Court's 
finding that Cendant would not be prejudiced by a time extension. 
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delay and remand solely for inclusion in settlement 
proceedings. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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